A veneer of an introduction
Our author has a degree in philosophy/pre-theology; if that sounds like watching paint dry, this esoteric article on morals likely isn’t for you.
Late ethnologist/primatologist Frans de Waal’s thoughts on veneer theory evolved considerably after I originally published this article in 2007. I like to think I might have influenced him.
de Waal softened some stances over the years, so my representations of his positions below likely do not reflect his stances on veneer theory as laid out in his later works. RIP Frans.
Veneer Theory Revisited: Moral Mimicry as Evolutionary Strategy
Veneer theory considers morals a cultural overlay, a thin veneer hiding an otherwise selfish and brutish human nature. Evolutionary ethicist Frans de Waal thinks veneer theory is a crock. I’m unaligned, but you know that saying about how any belief you have closes the door on countless other ideas? Yeah, beliefs are bad.
Frans de Waal discounts veneer theory because he thinks the veneer of human goodness exists outside of evolution, existing without an explanation. He can find no evolutionary reason for the veneer to exist.
However, humanity’s veneer of goodness over a bad core can live in harmony with biologically based morality.
This coexistence allows the veneer to easily fit in the Darwinian model. It’s not that humans fall into two discrete moral categories, but that both authentic moral agency and strategic moral mimicry can coexist, sometimes within the same individual. To suggest we’re either moral beings or not, i.e. veneer theory is a binary consideration, is misleading; this is not a dichotomy. True moral agents and those with only a moral-ish veneer can coexist.
That a trait or behavior exists and flourishes does not qualify it as a direct evolutionary advantage. Both blue and brown eyes are widespread in humans. Some of us are dark while some are pale. Both attached and detached earlobes are common, though neither is more beneficial than the other. While there might be specific instances when such variations come in handy, clearly a single species can exhibit different manifestations or deviations of a particular aspect of its phenotype without any one particular exhibition being more fit. I.e., what is, is not necessarily fit in the Darwinian sense.
Snakes, Salesmen, and the Evolution of Moral Appearance
We know of creatures benefiting from natural mimicry when a harmless animal resembles a dangerous and/or poisonous animal. (This is different from environmental camouflage e.g., a chameleon or a hunter/soldier in fatigues.) It is advantageous that the harmless king snake resembles the poisonous coral snake. The king snake needs only to appear to be poisonous. From this, we take that what is, though fit in a sense, might not be primarily so, in that this secondary fitness relies on disparate primary fitness.
Some people are good. Some people are bad. While de Waal denies the possibility of such a dichotomy, for this argument, we must accept that while there are obviously good/moral people, some people are bad (selfish/immoral/not good/etc.) This isn’t much of a stretch! After accepting this for the sake of argument, if nothing else, it’s easy to paint a picture of veneer theory coexisting with both moral agents and Darwin. If you are bad, would it not benefit you at times if others thought you good? I.e., can’t you be bad but seem good to some people sometimes? The marketeer touting the benefits of cigarettes, knowing they’re deadly, the adulterous spouse sleeping with a different trucker every night who gifts AIDS to their partner, the developer gaining rights to build on the three-eared poof owl’s last mating grounds even though the birds’ excrement is thought to be a panacea; by many counts, these are clearly bad people. By other narratives though, e.g., their parents or people who know them in other situations, these people seem good.
These baddies spend a lot of their time mimicking those who are good. How else would the marketeer be able to market, the adulterer seduce their score, or the developer get their permits? To many people, in many situations, those bad people appear to be good people because of a veneer of goodness.
When Being Good Isn’t Necessary: Seeming Good
Does the king snake’s unconscious mimicry harm the coral snake? Surely, on occasion, it does. For example, when a predator has had a good experience feasting on a king snake, and then luckily preys on a coral snake without consequence. Does the shifty bastard salesman selling the lemon to grandma give “good” salesmen a bad rap? Yes. In both cases, the mimic makes out more often than the model, getting all of the model’s benefits while never helping it and occasionally harming it.
The veneer of goodness is clearly then an evolutionary advantage if we accept these premises.
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Why did I write about veneer theory?
I originally published this piece in 2007 — a slightly cleaned-up version of a paper I wrote for a class we affectionately called “Philosophy of the Evolution of Morals in Primates.” The official class title was something mundane like “Senior Seminar”. I started college in 1992 and went to commencement a few years later. Wore the robe, hat, tassel, and all that. But I had an incomplete in a requisite senior-level Philosophy class: Thinking About Death. I’d researched the heck out of my paper on Islamic death rituals, but ten years later was still compelled to not finish it. Alas, I finally tired of my parents asking me when I’d get my diploma and ponied up the dough to pay for one last class.
That’s how we got to the article above.
Why am I republishing it now?
I’ve been thinking about morals and ethics lately. Things like: Is it okay to not be super-sad when a person assassinates the CEO of a company that makes billions from denying healthcare? Or to wonder how sad I’d be were someone to assassinate the Kurt Gruber of our time? Or dare I ponder: How vulgar is vulgar cultural relativism?!
But those ethical dilemmas are largely coincidental. Aforementioned mother recently brought to my attention that my musings on veneer theory made their way into the Wikipedia article on veneer theory, so I reread this piece for the first time in ages. Heady stuff! Why not give it some fresh light?
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Dan Dreifort is growing weary of penning third-person bylines. He tried taking a sabbatical this month, but found himself working too regularly. He’s recently started volunteering at a local toy store and still likes making noise with friends and soon-to-be friends. Thanks for reading!
Dan Dreifort 